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1. Introduction   
Since the 1990s, the Spanish economy has been characterized by a continuous growth 
in immigrant flows from African, Latin American, and European countries.  By January 2007, 
a total of 4,48 millions of foreigners –the equivalent of 9.93  percent of the population– resided  
in Spain (Padrón Municipal, INE 2007).  Most immigrants live in Catalonia, Madrid, 
Andalusia, Valencia, Murcia and the Canary or Balearic Islands.  The continuous growth in 
immigrant flows of the late nineties coexisted with a decrease in net inter-regional flows 
despite significant unemployment rate differences across regions.  We know through previous 
work by Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), Bentolila and Dolado (1991), Bentolila (1997, 2002) 
and Bover and Velilla (1999) that high unemployment rates are the main reason behind the 
observed decline in internal migration on the part of natives.  However, why have immigrant 
flows increased?  Are immigrants responding to labor market opportunities more than natives 
and, if so, have immigrant inflows significantly impacted regional labor market disparities?  
In this paper, we use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de 
Población Activa) from 1999 through 2007 to first examine immigrants’ responsiveness to 
employment opportunities relative to natives and, as such, better understand these new 
migratory patterns.  Given immigrants’ heterogeneity by country of origin, we distinguish 
among three major groups of Spanish immigrants in our analysis: Africans, Europeans, and 
Latinos.  Subsequently, we analyze whether these immigrant flows have altered regional 
unemployment disparities.   
Our work adds to previous work in the literature examining the location choices of 
immigrants (see, for instance, Bartel 1989 and Borjas 2001) and the local labor market 
implications of immigrant residential choices (e.g. Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996, Borjas  3
2001, Card 2001 and more recently Borjas 2003).  As noted by this second strand of literature, 
“area-approach” analyses relating regional immigration flows to regional employment 
opportunities via regression-based analyses are inappropriate because: (i) they fail to account 
for forces, other than immigrant flows, affecting immigrants’ location decisions, and (ii) they 
do not take into account the fact that natives may also be “voting with their feet”.  Therefore, 
using skill groups defined for each year and region as our units of observation, we construct 
indexes capturing the relative supply of immigrants as compared to natives.  We then use these 
indexes as dependent variables when examining immigrant location choices and their potential 
impacts on regional employment disparities.     
Much of the earlier literature examining immigrant location choices has primarily 
focused on the role played by existing networks of countrymen (e.g. Bartel 1989, Chiswick 
and Miller 1996).  If immigrants from a particular country have similar skills and occupational 
preferences, they will tend to locate in regions offering better employment choices and higher 
earnings.  The clustering of these immigrants will, in turn, give birth to ethnic enclaves that 
further raise the marginal benefit of moving to that region via higher wages (e.g. Mouw 2003; 
Munshi 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2006), while lowering the associated marginal 
costs via shorter job searches and lower psychic costs (e.g. Granovetter 1973, 1974; Bartel 
1989; Fernandez et al. 2000; Munshi 2003).  However, due to the recent nature of immigration 
in Spain and the relatively young age of immigrants in our sample,
1 we focus on the role of 
labor market conditions as a pull factor as networks are likely to develop thereafter.   
In addition to networks, the literature examining immigrant location choices has also 
focused on the role played by wages (e.g. Borjas 2001).  Due to the lack of adequate wage data  4
and in light of the traditionally high unemployment rates characteristic of some Spanish 
regions, we instead examine immigrant responsiveness to labor market prospects relative to 
natives.  Employment opportunities may be particularly relevant in the case of immigrants, for 
whom accessibility to any type of employment may be crucial for their immediate economic 
survival upon arrival to the host country.  We capture work prospects with regional 
employment rates for each skill group.  We hypothesize that immigrants are more responsive 
than natives to regional employment opportunities given their lower migration costs across 
Spanish regions relative to natives.  After all, natives have to break up family ties and 
withdraw from the safety net provided by these strong ties –a psychic costs already incurred by 
immigrants when deciding to emigrate.   
Why should we care about immigrants’ responsiveness to regional labor market 
conditions relative to their native counterparts?  In Spain, relatively sticky wages and high 
costs of adjustment due to union contract provisions, social norms, and government legislation 
regarding job protection policies have reduced the rate at which new jobs are created and 
increased the duration of unemployment, leading to higher structural unemployment rates 
(Bentolila and Blanchard 1990, Bentolila and Dolado 1991, Bentolila and Jimeno 1998, 2003).  
As such, immigrants’ greater responsiveness to better employment prospects could play a 
crucial role in correcting regional employment imbalances (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1992).    
Our results indicate that immigrants choose to reside in regions with larger employment 
rates and where their likelihood of finding a job is higher.  This is particularly true for African 
and Latino immigrants, who have lesser educational attainment and exhibit higher 
unemployment rates.  Non-15 European immigrants, perhaps owing to their greater skill 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 As noted by Bartel (1989), young individuals are likely to face lower psychic costs to relocation.  This is 
particularly true among immigrants, who are then less likely to need the emotional support offered by ethnic  5
transferability, do not seem to significantly differ from natives in their response to the 
employment outlook when choosing where to reside.  The higher employment rates enjoyed by 
Latino and European immigrants relative to their African counterparts may explain how past 
Latino and European immigration could help reduce regional labor market disparities.     
In what follows, we first describe some of the features of the Spanish labor market, 
such as its traditionally high unemployment rate and the recent receipt of large immigrant 
flows.  Subsequently, we present our hypotheses and discuss the methodology we rely upon to 
examine immigrants’ responsiveness to regional employment opportunities and its effect on 
regional employment disparities.  Results and conclusions close the study.   
2.  Institutional Framework  
2.1.  Spanish Immigration and Migration Policy  
Up to the mid 1970s, Spain had experienced more out-migration than immigration.  As 
shown by Figure 1, immigration grew at a particular fast pace from the late 1990s onwards 
despite the restrictions that the ‘Aliens’ Law’ of 1985 imposed on non-European Union 
foreigners in order to establish Spanish residency and citizenship.
2   
[Insert Figure 1] 
Over the 12-year period shown in Figure 1, the number of foreign-born living in Spain grew 
from less than 1 percent of the population to approximately 10 percent.  Various elements 
steered this trend, such as the country’s democratization, the rapid economic growth in part 
fueled by Spain’s incorporation to the European Common Market in 1986, the free-entrance of 
foreigners as tourists together with a lax implementation of immigration laws, and the close 
                                                                                                                                                          
enclaves.   
2 One of these restrictions include the need to acquire a work and a residency permit in order to become legal 
immigrants, along with the granting of 1-year permits to work in a particular activity and geographic location.    6
linguistic, cultural ties, and preferential treatment to Latin Americans due to colonial history 
(Escrivá 2000, Ribas-Mateos 2000).   
As of today, in spite of augmented immigration restrictions consisting of limited work 
and residency permit renewals, as well as immigration quotas implemented during the 1990s,
3 
Spain is considered the most popular port of entry for Latino immigrants (Millman and 
Vitzthum 2003).  Additionally, Spain receives a significant immigrant flow from Africa, 
particularly Morocco, given its proximity to the Spanish peninsula.  Immigrant flows from 
these two regions have been primarily propelled by the investment of Spanish companies in 
Latin America, as well as by the political and economic crises in Latin America and Africa 
during much of the 1990s.  Based on our sample of immigrants from the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey (1999-2007) and according to the figures in Table 1A, the vast majority of immigrants 
in these regions are primarily Latinos (52.3 percent).  The other two significant groups are 
immigrants from Africa (24.4 percent) and non-15 European countries (24.3 percent).
4  In 
some regions, as is the case with Catalonia and Murcia, African immigrants constitute the 
second largest immigrant group after Latinos.  Additionally, the figures in Table 1B suggest 
that most immigrants choose to reside in either Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia or Andalucía.   
[Insert Tables 1A and 1B] 
What is the role played by regional labor market conditions in attracting these immigrant 
flows?  In particular, do job opportunities serve as immigrant magnets to these regions?  And, 
does the location choice of immigrants in turn help correct regional imbalances?  Before 
                                                 
3 Starting in 1993, the Spanish government has been implementing a quota system for agriculture and domestic 
services.  See Escrivá (2000) for greater details.   
4 Immigrants from Asia, North America and Oceania represent, altogether, less than 5 percent of all immigrants.  
Therefore, we exclude them from the analysis.  EU-15 citizens have not been considered under the category of 
immigrants given their differences with respect to the vast majority of immigrants in our sample.   7
addressing the aforementioned questions, it is important to highlight some key features of the 
Spanish labor market. 
2.2.   The Spanish Unemployment Rate   
One of the crucial characteristics of the Spanish labor market has been its traditionally 
high unemployment rate, particularly during the eighties and early nineties.  Still today, despite 
the impressive economic growth enjoyed by the Spanish economy, Spain continues to have 
one of the highest unemployment rates among other OECD countries.  Table 2 displays 
average unemployment rates nationwide as well as by region for selected years: 1976, 1991, 
2003, and 2005.  Average unemployment rates remained well above 10 percent since the mid 
eighties for practically a decade.  Moreover, there are very important unemployment rate 
differences across regions.  In particular, while unemployment rates in Navarra, Baleares, 
Aragón, La Rioja or Madrid are below 7 percent, Extremadura, Andalucía, Canary Islands, 
Galicia and Asturias exhibit double-digit unemployment rates.   
[Insert Table 2] 
As noted by Bentolila (1997, 2002), Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), and Bentolila and 
Dolado (1991), among others, sticky wages accompanied by limited internal geographic 
mobility may have perpetuated regional imbalances between labor demand and supply and, 
therefore, structural unemployment.  Consequently, a better understanding of the geographic 
mobility of immigrants is of great importance as their responsiveness to differences in 
employment rates across regions could help correct regional labor market imbalances 
(Blanchard and Katz 1992).  Do immigrants locate in regions with better employment 
prospects?  A joint look to the figures in Table 1A and Table 2 reveals that some of the regions 
with the highest incidence of immigration, such as Madrid or Catalonia, have relatively low  8
unemployment rates (approximately 7 percent) in 2005.  Yet, other immigrant receiving 
regions, such as Andalucía or Valencia, display unemployment rates in the order of 14 percent 
and 9 percent, correspondingly.  Therefore, at a descriptive level, it is unclear whether 
immigrants choose to reside in regions offering better employment prospects.   
3.   Conceptual Framework 
The migration decision can be viewed as an investment decision where both natives 
and foreign-born individuals are income maximizers.  As such, migration decisions are guided 
by the comparison of the present value of lifetime earnings in alternative employment 
opportunities net of migration costs.  If migration costs primarily consist of large fixed costs, 
many individuals may not find it worth while to migrate.  Specifically, if the potential earnings 
differential across regions is not large enough, many natives will choose to stay home as inter-
regional wage differences will not compensate for incurred migration costs.  In contrast, if 
most immigrants originate from countries with significantly lower wages (as it may be the case 
with migrants originating from many African and Latin American nations), the earnings 
differential between Spain and their home countries is likely to widely exceed any earnings 
differentials encountered by natives between Spanish regions.  In this case, we may observe 
more international than internal native migration.   
Furthermore, once in Spain, foreign-born individuals are likely to exhibit lower 
migration costs than natives with strong ties to their birth communities.  After all, natives have 
to break up family ties when migrating from one region to another, whereas immigrants have 
already incurred this psychological cost by choosing to start anew in the host country.  At the 
most, they may have to give up networks of countrymen they may have connected with.    9
Therefore, immigrants should be more likely to choose to reside in the region r where their 
labor earnings are expected to be larger.   
Unfortunately, we know of no data set containing representative individual level 
information on earnings and immigrant status.  Yet, due to traditionally high unemployment 
rates, workers may be particularly responsive to employment prospects.  As such, we focus on 
the role played by the probability of finding employment (φ ) in shaping individual level 
earnings and, therefore, any residential choice as follows: 
(1)  { } max rs rs j js js ww φφ = , where:  17 ,... 1 = j  for each of the seventeen Spanish regions. 
Specifically,  rs w stands for the wage earned by a person with skills s in region r  and  rs φ  
represents her/his employment likelihood.   
In sum, the described framework has some interesting implications for understanding 
the high immigration rate and, yet, the low internal mobility of natives in Spain.  First, 
immigrants should exhibit a greater responsiveness to employment opportunities than natives.  
Secondly, by being more responsive than their native counterparts, immigrants may promote 
employment convergence across regions.  Why?  As noted by the previous literature (Bentolila 
and Blanchard 1990, Bentolila and Dolado 1991, Bentolila and Jimeno 1998, 2003, the 
traditionally high Spanish unemployment can be characterized as structural unemployment 
arising from regional imbalances in labor demand and supply.  This type of unemployment 
typically persists in the presence of sticky wages –typically resulting from union contract 
provisions, social norms or government legislation concerning (such as minimum wages and 
job protection policies)– and if internal mobility is low, as argued by Bentolila and Dolado 
(1991), Bentolila (1997, 2002) and Bover and Velilla (1999).  Under such circumstances, the  10
higher responsiveness of immigrants to employment opportunities in specific regions could 
help erode regional imbalances in unemployment (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1992).                   
4. Methodology 
4.1.   Are Immigrants More Responsive than Natives to Employment Opportunities? 
Traditionally, a variety of studies have relied on regional correlations between 
immigration rates and labor market conditions to learn about the role of the latter in attracting 
immigrant flows.  However, this “area approach” strategy has come under criticism, notably by 
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996), Borjas (2001), Card (2001) and more recently Borjas (2003) 
on two counts.  First, labor market conditions in a particular region could be affected by native 
inflows and outflows regardless of immigrant flows.  If so, how can we measure the impact of 
labor market conditions on the supply of immigrants relative to natives when labor market 
conditions themselves are a by-product of native migration flows?  Second, cross-sectional 
analyses may fail to account for demand shocks affecting local labor market conditions and, as 
such, incite an erroneous interpretation of the correlation coefficients between immigrant flows 
and labor market conditions.   
To lessen any omitted variable biases, we follow the methodology proposed by Borjas 
(2001) and used by Carrasco et al. (2004), among others, which consists in simply grouping 
the individual data in cells defined for different skill groups, regions, and years.  This unit of 
observation recognizes that immigrants are a very heterogeneous group.  As such, we assume 
that natives only compete with immigrants with similar skills.  Each skill group is an age-
education cell where both age and education are defined over three categories (age: 30 or less, 
31-45, and 45 plus; education: primary education or less, secondary education, and university  11
degree).  Therefore, we have nine skill groups.
5  We then measure the supply of immigrants 
(relative to natives) in a particular region at a point in time for each of the nine age-education 
groups with the following index:  
(2)  () () ()
() () t N t N




rs =      
where  () t Irs  represents the number of immigrants in region r and skill (age-education) group s 
at period t, and  () t Nrs  represents the number of natives in region r and skill group s at period t.  
Therefore, the index  () t Krs  measures the relative supply of immigrants vis à vis natives in a 
particular skill group, region, and time period.  The index equals 1 when immigrant and native 
workers of the same skill level have the same geographic distribution, and it is greater than 1 
when immigrants in a particular skill group are overrepresented in a particular region at a 
specific point in time.  Since we are working with 9 skill groups, 17 regions (or Autonomous 
Communities), and 9 years (1999-2007), the index in equation (2) is defined for 1377 groups 
(i.e. 9 skill groups*17 regions*9 years).       
  To the extent that regional employment opportunities and the relative supply of 
immigrants are likely to be simultaneously determined, instrumenting the former may be 
necessary.  However, as recognized by others (e.g. Borjas 2001), finding a set of valid 
instruments, i.e. a set of variables that are highly correlated with regional employment 
opportunities, yet uncorrelated with any of the variables explaining the relative supply of 
immigrants to natives, is virtually impossible.  As such, we instead lag our explanatory 
variable to at least guarantee its pre-determined character.  This model specification is likely to 
                                                 
5 These nine skill groups are defined as follows: (1) primary or less and 30 years or less, (2) primary or less and 
31-45 years, (3) primary or less and 45 plus years, (4) secondary and 30 years or less, (5) secondary and 31-45  12
also best reflect how migrants behave.  Since migration involves an important human capital 
investment decision, it is reasonable to observe a time lag between the time period to which the 
regional employment conditions are referred to and immigrant flows.  Therefore, we estimate 
the following model:  
 (3)  () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1* * * rs rs s r t s t r t s r rs K Et t βν η θ ν θ η θ ν η ε =− + + + + + ++    
where  () 1 − t Ers   stands for past employment opportunities for individuals of skill s in region 
r  at time () 1 − t .  Additionally, equation (3) includes a series of fixed-effects vectors, such as: 
s ν  stand for skill (age-education) fixed-effects,  r η  for regional fixed-effects, and  t θ for time 
fixed-effects, and their interaction terms.  In this manner, we are able to capture educational, 
regional and time characteristics possibly affecting the relative supply of immigrants to natives 
in a particular cell, such as differences in the educational system, regional cost-of-living 
differences or housing shortages, and macroeconomic trends.  Equation (3) is estimated for all 
immigrants (relative to natives) as well as separately for our most prominent groups of 
immigrants: Latinos, Europeans (non-EU15), and Africans.   
4.2.   Does Immigration Help Reduce Regional Employment Disparities?  
A second question of great interest to us is whether the increase in immigration has 
brought about regional convergence in employment rates by attracting migrants to regions with 
higher employment rates versus regions with lower employment rates.  As discussed earlier in 
the paper, much of the Spanish unemployment can be classified as structural unemployment 
arising from regional imbalances in labor demand and supply.  This type of unemployment 
could be significantly reduced via immigrants’ greater responsiveness to employment 
                                                                                                                                                          
years, (6) secondary and 45 years or more, (7) university and 30 years or less, (8) university and 31-45 years, (9)  13
opportunities in specific regions (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1992).  We examine this possibility 
by estimating the following model, inspired in the wage convergence models in the 
macroeconomics literature:
6 
(4)  ( ) () () () ( ) ( ) t t E t t t E t E rs rs s s rx rs ε β α + + = − +1 
where  () t Ers  is the employment rate for skill group s in region r and year t and  () t s β  is the so-
called convergence coefficient for skill group s and period t.  Equation (4) is estimated for each 
skill group –defined by age and educational attainment,  and each year.   
  Once we have the employment convergence coefficients for each skill group and year, 
we use the immigrant penetration index used by Borjas (2001) to examine whether 
immigration helps regional convergence in employment rates or not.  The immigrant 
penetration index is defined as: 
















where  () 1 , + t t Is  is the number of immigrants in skill group s entering Spain between t and t+1 
and  () t Ns  is the number of natives in skill group s at time period t.  We then use the previously 
estimated employment convergence coefficients to regress them on the immigrant penetration 
index as follows: 
(6)  () ( )( ) t t bg a t s s ε β + + =  
Equation (6) is estimated using weighted OLS,
7 and for three different specifications: without 
fixed effects, with skill group fixed effects, and with skill group and year fixed effects. The 
                                                                                                                                                          
university and 45 years or more.  
6 See, in particular, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) for wage convergence and Blanchard and Katz (1992) 
for employment convergence. 
7  As in Borjas (2001), we use the inverse of the square of the standard error to correct for any heteroscedasticity.  14
estimates from equation (6) will help gauge whether and, if so, to what extent, immigration 
helps attain regional employment convergence.  
5.   Data and Descriptive Evidence 
5.1.   Data 
We use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey for the period 1999 through 2007.  
This survey is administered to approximately 60,000 households on a quarterly basis.  For the 
empirical analysis, we use a pooled cross-sectional database of all active immigrants included 
in the survey.  We define immigrants as individuals with a foreign citizenship and exclude 
those from EU-15 countries as they are not representative of most immigrants in Spain.  This 
definition thus includes individuals with a double nationality –a group that accounts for 3 
percent of our sample.  At any rate, we exclude naturalized citizens from our definition of 
immigrants since questions like the years of residence in the country are only asked to non-
naturalized immigrants.  As such, the small sample size of individuals with a double 
nationality from birth ends up not altering our findings.  The survey collects detailed personal 
and job characteristics from every interviewed individual, native or immigrant, with the 
exception of wages.  In addition, for immigrants, we have information on their country of 
origin and on the number of years residing in Spain.   
It is worth noting that immigrants in the Labor Force Survey reside in registered 
households; otherwise, they would have never been interviewed by the survey.  Therefore, 
immigrants in our sample are most likely authorized immigrants, restricting the validity of our 
inferences to this group.  At any rate, to ensure the most representativeness of our data as far as 
immigrant concentration and distribution is concerned, we use the last release of the EPA, 
where observations are weighted according to the 2001 Population Census believed to better  15
account for the immigrant population.
8  Finally, given our focus on immigrant responsiveness 
to employment opportunities relative to natives, we restrict our sample to individuals in 
working age, i.e., 16-64 years of age.  
5.2.   Immigrant and Native Profiles According to Skill  
The largest fraction of our immigrant sample, about 52.3 percent of all immigrants 
between 16 and 64 years of age comes from Central and South America.  An additional 24.4 
percent originates in Africa and 24.3 percent comes from Non-15 European countries.   
What are some of the characteristics of natives and immigrants in our sample?  Table 3 
addresses this question.  For instance, immigrants are approximately 6 years younger than 
natives and a slightly higher fraction are female relative to natives.  Education-wise, natives 
display a higher educational attainment than the average immigrant in our sample although, as 
we shall discuss in what follows, there are important differences by immigrant origin.   
  Table 3 also shows the characteristics of immigrants by region of origin.  As reflected 
by the figures, there are notable differences across the three major migrant groups in our 
sample: Africans, Non15-Europeans, and Latinos.  For instance, only 38.3 percent of Africans 
are female relative to 57.7 percent of Latinos.  Additionally, 24.2 percent of African migrants 
are household heads, compared with 19 percent of Latinos. Education-wise, we also find 
important divergences across immigrant groups depending on their origin.  Forty-five percent 
of African migrants have no more than a primary education, whereas only 15 and 21 percent of 
Non15-Europeans and Latinos fall within that category.  In contrast, only 18 percent of African 
immigrants have a university degree compared to 22 percent of Spanish natives or 27 percent 
                                                 
8  For more information on the 2005 EPA methodology, please visit: http://www.ine.es  16
of Europeans.  Lastly, African migrants endure the highest unemployment rate (approximately 
14 percent) of all immigrants and natives.   
[Insert Table 3] 
6.  Results   
  Before turning to the first question we want to address in this paper, i.e., whether 
immigrants are more responsive, in terms of their geographic location, to employment 
opportunities than natives, it is important to make a clarification regarding our units of 
observation.  As noted in the methodology, the use of age-education cells implicitly assumes 
similar employment opportunities are within the reach of immigrants and natives with similar 
skills as captured by age and education.  This is a restricting assumption.  After all, immigrants 
may also take jobs typically occupied by natives with lower educational attainment if 
available.  Therefore, we also carry the analysis using age as our skill measure.  In this manner, 
we allow for immigrants to respond to employment rates for groups with other educational 
attainment.     
  Additionally, we allow immigrants and natives to respond not only to employment 
opportunities for individuals within their cell, but also to employment opportunities for 
workers in adjacent cells.  Specifically, in addition to the lagged employment rate for 
individuals in their particular skill group (as captured by age-education), we also examine the 
responsiveness of immigrants to employment opportunities (as captured by the employment 
rate) for individuals in skill groups defined exclusively by age.  Because these employment 
rate measures are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is above 0.75), we carry out 
separate estimations for each set of employment rates.    
6.1.   Are Immigrants More Responsive than Natives to Employment Opportunities?  17
Table 4 displays the results from estimating equation (3) for all immigrants and for 
separate immigrant groups according to their region of origin, i.e. Africa, Non 15-EU, and 
Latin America.  The figures in Panel A in Table 4 reveal that, when skill is defined in terms of 
age-education categories, immigrants as a whole are more responsive than similarly skilled 
natives to regional employment opportunities, particularly, those employment opportunities 
available for their own skill group.
9  By immigrant origin, Africans appear the most responsive 
to existing employment opportunities for their skill level, followed by Latinos.  However, non-
15EU immigrants do not seem to respond any differently than natives to existing employment 
opportunities.  When we use a broader definition of skill in Panel B, we continue to find that 
immigrants are more responsive than natives to employment opportunities.  Yet, by immigrant 
origin, only Latinos seem to be significantly more responsive than natives to existing 
employment conditions.
10  
[Insert Table 4] 
  Why would immigrants be more responsive than natives to employment conditions?  
Immigrants are, by definition, a mobile population.  Once they have made the investment of 
breaking family and friendship ties in their home countries to migrate to another country and 
start anew, the difference in psychic and economic costs associated with residing in one region 
versus another in the host country should be significantly smaller than for natives.  After all, 
relative to immigrants, natives still have to break the family and friendship ties and, thus incur, 
the psychic costs that immigrants have already faced when deciding to come to Spain.      
                                                 
9 When the employment rate for their age-region-year category is used as the independent variable, the sign is also 
positive.  However, the coefficient is never statistically different from zero due to the higher standard errors.  
10 At this juncture, it is worth noting that, although the number of cells without immigrants is negligible when 
examining all immigrants, the number of cells lacking immigrants when we distinguish immigrants according to 
their origin is non-negligible.  This is particularly the case when skill is defined in terms of age and education. 
Consequently, we have also carried out the analysis excluding any immigrant-empty cells.  The results, which are 
available from the authors upon request, prove robust to the alternative specification.  18
And, why would Africans and Latinos be more responsive than natives to employment 
opportunities?  African and Latino immigrants, perhaps as a result of the lesser degree of their 
skill transferability as compared to other migrants from Europe where educational systems 
may be more alike owing to geopolitical aspects, may have lower reservation wages than 
natives.  Consequently, both immigrant groups may be more responsive to employment 
opportunities that alike natives would not even consider.     
6.2.   Does Immigration Help Reduce Regional Employment Disparities?   
  To further assess whether immigration helps reduce regional employment imbalances 
or disparities, we first estimate equation (4) for each of the skill groups and years in our sample 
to derive the so-called regional employment converge coefficients displayed in Table 5.   
[Insert Table 5] 
When statistically different from zero, the convergence coefficient always displays a negative 
sign, which means that there is employment convergence across regions in Spain.  The average 
value for the convergence coefficients in Table 5 turns out to be -0.03.   Following the 
macroeconomics literature on convergence rates, this means that the time required to cut the 
initial employment gap in half can be calculated using the equation: ( ) 5 . 0 1 = +
t β  or 23 years.    
 We  then  estimate  equation  (6) to assess whether higher immigration inflows help attain 
employment convergence or not.  The latter might occur if there is sufficient interregional 
native mobility.  However, native interregional mobility in Spain is very low.  A recent report 
from the Spanish Employment Institute (i.e. “INEM Employment Observatory” (2006)) shows 
that, as of 2006, seventy-eight percent of Spanish citizens live in the same province in which 
they were born.  Since the province is a narrower geopolitical category than the autonomous 
community used in this paper, we can exclude native mobility across autonomous communities  19
(so-called regions in this paper) as a potential factor affecting regional employment 
convergence.  Alternatively, it is also possible to not find any significant labor market impacts 
if changes in the industrial structure accommodate the increase in labor supply (e.g. Lewis 
(2003)).   
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the convergence coefficient and the 
immigrant penetration index quantified in Table 6.   
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 6] 
There is a downward-sloping relationship between the convergence coefficient and immigrant 
penetration in each of the labor markets defined by skill group and year, thus suggesting that 
immigrant inflows help accelerate regional employment convergence.  Therefore, we estimate 
equation (6) excluding, as well as including, a variety of skill group and year fixed-effects.  
According to the figures in Table 6, if we look at the change in the average immigrant 
penetration index between 2005 and 2006 in Table 5 (i.e. an increase of 0.51), the magnitude 
of the coefficient in Table 6 (i.e. -0.04) implies that the change in the immigrant penetration 
index would lower the convergence coefficient from -0.03 to -0.05.  Therefore, the half-life of 
regional employment disparities would be cut from 23 years to approximately 14 years.  In 
other words, immigration helps speed up the regional employment convergence process.   
However, as we control for skill group and year fixed-effects in equation (6), the statistical 
significance of the coefficient disappears.  This is not surprising to the extent that we are left 
with a small number of degrees of freedom when including as many fixed-effects.  In any 
event, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between the immigrant penetration 
index and the convergence coefficient in these alternative specifications suggests the need to  20
be cautious when discussing the role of immigration flows in significantly impacting regional 
employment convergence.   
7.   Conclusions   
  In this paper, we use data from the Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta de Población 
Activa) for the years 1999 through 2006 to assess the role of regional labor market 
opportunities in explaining the continuous growth in immigrant flows relative to internal 
migration on the part of natives during the 1990s.  Specifically, we ask ourselves whether 
immigrants are more responsive than their native counterparts to regional labor market 
opportunities.  Additionally, we explore whether the growing stock of immigrants has helped 
grease the wheels of the Spanish labor market and contributed to reducing labor market 
disparities across regions by accelerating regional employment convergence.  
  Following Borjas (2001, 2003) and Card (2003), we estimate the impact of 
employment opportunities on the relative supply of immigrants as compared to natives using 
skill cells as units of observations.  Subsequently, we analyze whether the growing immigrant 
stock has helped reduce regional labor market disparities as accelerating regional employment 
convergence for each skill group.      
Our findings indicate that, overall, immigrants choose to reside in regions with higher 
employment rates and where they also enjoy greater employment opportunities given their 
skills.  When distinguishing according to immigrant origin, we further find that African and 
Latino immigrants appear more responsive than their native counterparts to higher 
employment rates as well as to a higher likelihood of employment.  Yet, Non-15 Europeans do 
not seem to respond any different from their  native counterparts to existing employment 
opportunities.  As we note in the paper, our findings could be due to a variety of factors.  21
African and Latino immigrants, perhaps as a result of their limited skill transferability relative 
to immigrants originating from European countries with similar educational systems, in part 
owing to geopolitical aspects, may have lower reservation wages than natives.   
Additionally, the increased immigrant penetration appears to have accelerated regional 
employment convergence at a descriptive level as well as in a simple OLS regression of 
convergence rates on the immigrant penetration index for each skill group.  However, perhaps 
owing to the limited degrees of freedom, this link is no longer statistically different from zero 
once we include skill group and year fixed-effects.  We can only hypothesize as for why.  
Perhaps, as noted by González and Ortega (2007), it is possible for the regional industry to 
change and absorb the higher immigrant penetration, in which case, immigration would have 
no significantly effect on the employment rates of workers in similar skill groups.   
Alternatively, the lack of a significant impact is partially due to the recent nature of 
immigration in Spain.  In that case, it would be of interest to monitor this effect as immigration 
continues to grow in order to assess the suitability of a generalized amnesty for undocumented 
immigrants.   
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          Note: Each point represents the penetration of immigrants and convergence coefficient for each of the 
skill groups (9 in total) and years (8 in total) specified in columns 1 and 3, Table 5.  26
Table 1A  









Andalucia (1)  22.1  26.8  51.1  1837 
Aragón(2) 27.2  34.1  38.7  1178 
Asturias (3)  10.5  20.4  69.1  181 
Balears (4)  25.3  13.8  61.0  1266 
Canary Islands (5)   17.4  9.2  73.4  1351 
Cantabria (6)  3.0  24.3  72.7  301 
Castilla-León (7)  17.2  35.2  47.6  1392 
Castilla-La Mancha (8)  21.9  38.1  40.0  1466 
Catalonia (9)  42.6  14.3  43.1  3868 
Com. Valenciana (10)  20.5  35.7  43.9  3319 
Extremadura (11)  47.0  15.7  37.3  236 
Galicia (12)  13.0  11.3  75.7  462 
Madrid (13)  13.0  24.1  63.0  2717 
Murcia (14)  33.2  8.1  58.7  1659 
Navarra  (15)  11.1  21.0  67.9  539 
País Vasco (16)  19.2  20.5  60.3  532 
Rioja, La (17)  25.9  24.5  49.6  575 
 Source:   Spanish Labor Force survey, 1999-2007. Individuals between 16-64 years.  
Immigrants from Asia, North-America and Other are excluded from the sample as 
they represent less than 5% of  total immigrants.  Individuals from EU-15 are not 















Andalucia (1)  7.3  9.2  7.9 
Aragón(2) 5.7  7.6  3.8 
Asturias (3)  0.3  0.7  1.0 
Balears (4)  5.7  3.3  6.4 
Canary Islands (5)   4.3  2.3  8.4 
Cantabria (6)  0.2  1.4  1.8 
Castilla-León (7)  4.4  9.2  5.6 
Castilla-La Mancha (8)  5.7  10.4  4.8 
Catalonia (9)  30.0  10.4  13.9 
Com. Valenciana (10)  12.3  22.3  12.2 
Extremadura (11)  2.0  0.7  0.8 
Galicia (12)  1.2  1.0  2.9 
Madrid (13)  6.3  12.3  14.3 
Murcia (14)  9.9  2.6  8.1 
Navarra  (15)  1.2  2.1  3.1 
País Vasco (16)  1.8  2.0  2.7 
Rioja, La (17)  2.7  2.5  2.4 
Total   5579  5320  11960 
 Source:   Spanish Labor Force survey, 1999-2007. Individuals 
between 16-64 years.  Immigrants from Asia, North-America and 
Other are excluded from the sample as they represent less than 5% of  
total immigrants.  Individuals from EU-15 are not considered as 
immigrants either.   
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Table 2  
 Regional Unemployment Rates for Selected Years 
 
Years  Regions  1976 1991 2003 2005 
Andalucia  9.35  24.47 18.17 13.78 
Aragón  2.54 9.37 6.48 6.28 
Asturias    3.08  15.69 10.74 10.82 
Balears    3.32 8.5 9.18  6.03 
Canary  Islands  8.55  24.49 11.56 12.38 
Cantabria  2.78 15.25  10.48 9.09 
Castilla and León  2.69  14.5  11.19  8.64 
Castilla-La  Mancha  4.57 13.71 9.74  9.35 
Catalonia  3.46 11.68 9.37  7.12 
Valencia  3.23 15.78  10.94 9.24 
Extremadura  4.27  24.32 16.51 15.15 
Galicia  1.56  12.56 11.85 11.11 
Madrid    4.66 11.26 7.01  6.87 
Murcia    4.77 16.59 9.56  8.05 
Navarra    3.94 10.24 5.15  5.12 
País Vasco  3.45  18.7  9  7.57 
Rioja    1.63  9.26  5.58  6.45 




Table 3  
Means and Standard Deviations of Key Characteristics of Natives and Immigrants in the Sample (%)  
 
Variables Natives  Immigrants  Africans  Non-15   
Europeans 
Latinos 
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Observations 981693  225859  5579  5320  11960 
 Note: Individuals between 16-64 years.  Immigrants from Asia, North-America and Other are excluded from 
the sample as they represent less than 5% of  total immigrants.  Individuals from EU-15 are not considered in 







Immigrant vs. Native Responsiveness to Employment Opportunities 
 
PANEL A: Dependent Variable:  ( )
1 rs K t , ( 1 s =age-education), (Observations=1224) 
Immigrant Groups  All Immigrants   Africans   Non EU15 
European  
Latinos  
Independent  Variables  Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R  
            























            
PANEL B: Dependent Variable:  ( )
2 rs K t , ( 2 s =age), (Observations=408) 
Immigrant Groups  All Immigrants  Africans  Non EU15 
European 
Latinos 
Independent  Variables  Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R   Coeff.  2 R  
            












Notes:  The unit of observation is the region-skill-year cell.  In Panel A, skill is defined in terms of age and education (3 
age groups and three education groups).  The coefficients and R-squared shown in the table are the results of different 
regressions, each of them including as an independent variable the lagged employment rate defined at different levels of 
aggregation, i.e. skill 1 (defined by age and education) and skill 2 (defined by age).  In Panel B, skill is defined in terms 
of age.  All estimations are weighted by cell size.  There are region, skill and year fixed-effect dummies.  All regressions 
also include the skill, region, and year fixed-effects fully interacted.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 





Estimated Employment Convergence Rates 






Year 1999       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.44
***  0.15 -3.55 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  0.17 0.19  -3.341 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.53
*** 0.19 -4.191 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  0.23
* 0.15  -3.094 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.36
*** 0.12 -2.499 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.29
* 0.19  -2.826 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  -0.19 0.14  -2.735 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.36
*** 0.14 -1.436 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.017 0.08  -5.854 
Year 2000       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.09
** 0.04  -4.189 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.14
*** 0.05 -4.707 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.13
*** 0.05 -4.592 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  0.07 0.06  -3.337 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.06 0.06  -4.25 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.10
* 0.06  -3.009 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  0.036 0.068  -3.13 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.16
*** 0.07 -5.145 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  0.11 0.11  -5.726 
Year 2001       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.19
*** 0.04 -4.552 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.09 0.08  -4.699 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    0.053 0.11  -3.656 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.28
*** 0.06 -3.023 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.14
* 0.08  -4.084 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.25
*** 0.11 -4.031 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  0.002 0.04  -4.606 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.18
*** 0.04  -5.0 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.09 0.11  -4.154 
Year 2002       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.21
*** 0.07 -4.625 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  0.10 0.09  -2.854 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.21
** 0.12 -2.85 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.31
*** 0.13 -3.129 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.25
*** 0.11 -1.69 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  0.07 0.11  -5.27 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  -0.15
*** 0.04 -5.18 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.01 0.03  -4.465 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.09
*** 0.04 -3.418 
Year 2003       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  0.02  0.06  -4.313 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.04 0.05  -3.757 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.004 0.08  -3.413 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.22
*** 0.05 -3.699 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.23 0.17  -3.898 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.24 0.18  -4.377 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  -0.25
*** 0.12 -3.993 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.34
*** 0.16  -3.9 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university ) -0.21 0.15  -4.369  32
Table 5 (cont) 
Estimated Employment Convergence Rates 
Note:  The unit of observation is the region (i.e. 17 autonomous communities) for each skill and year.  
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heterogeneity.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at 





















      
Year 2004       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.24
*** 0.12 -3.346 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.22
*** 0.11 -3.384 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.42
*** 0.16 -2.966 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.04  0.04  -5.57 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.11
*** 0.05 -6.23 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.11
* 0.07  -6.055 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  0.02  0.11  -5.828 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.08  0.06  -5.978 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.06  0.08  -4.934 
Year 2005       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  0.007  0.09  -4.86 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.15
*** 0.06 -4.602 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.09  0.07  -5.558 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.17  0.11  -4.899 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.12  0.09  -4.548 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.03  0.05  -4.531 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  -0.04  0.13  -4.05 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  0.002  0.10  -4.256 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.21
*** 0.14 -5.286 
Year 2006       
  Skill 1 (Age<30 ; Education=primary )  -0.06  0.08  -4.617 
    Skill 2 (Age<30 ; Education=secondary )  -0.12  0.55  -4.4 
Skill 3 (Age<30 ; Education=university )    -0.11
*** 0.03 -4.469 
Skill 4 (30<Age<46 ; Education=primary )  -0.13  0.08  -4.403 
Skill 5 (30<Age<46 ; Education=secondary )  -0.18
* 0.10  -5.271 
Skill 6 (30<Age<46 ; Education=university )  -0.20
*** 0.05 -3.26 
Skill 7 (Age>45 ; Education=primary )  -0.29
*** 0.09 -3.546 
Skill 8 (Age>45 ; Education=secondary )  -0.14  0.11  -4.245 
Skill 9 (Age>45 ; Education=university )  -0.15  0.13  -3.786  33
Table 6 
The Impact of the Immigration Penetration Index on Regional Employment Convergence Rates 
  
Note:  The unit of observation is the region-skill-year cell.  All estimations are weighted using 
the inverse of the square of the standard error to correct for any potential heteroscedasticity in 
the error term.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** Signifies statistically different from 
















Specification Coefficient  R-squared  Observations 
      




With skill group fixed effects  -0.016 
(0.02) 
0.26 72 
With skill group and year fixed effects  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.36 72 
      